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This paper empirically examines perceptions of the criminal justice system held by young males
using longitudinal survey data from the recent National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort
and the National Youth Survey. While beliefs about the probability of an arrest are positively
correlated with local o±cial arrest rates, they are largely idiosyncratic and unresponsive to infor-
mation about the arrests of other random individuals and local neighborhood conditions. There
is little support, therefore, for the `broken windows' theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982). Yet,
perceptions do respond to changes in an individual's own criminal and arrest history. Young males
who engage in crime but are not arrested revise their perceived probability of arrest downward,
while those who are arrested revise their probability upwards. Beliefs respond similarly to changes
in a sibling's criminal history. The perceived probability of arrest is then linked to subsequent crim-
inal behavior. Cross-sectionally, youth with a lower perceived probability of arrest are signi¯cantly
more likely to engage in crime during subsequent periods. Following an arrest, individuals commit
less crime, consistent with deterrence theory and the fact that their perceived probability of arrest
increases.
1 Introduction
The economics literature on crime implicitly assumes that individuals are well-informed about ar-
rest and conviction rates (as well as sentencing policies) and, therefore, respond immediately to any
changes in the criminal justice system. Many criminologists have questioned this assumption based on
studies of perceived certainty and severity of punishment. Empirical studies of deterrence theory are,
therefore, based on two distinct approaches: one which estimates the e®ect of actual or o±cial mea-
sures of certainty and severity of punishment (or observed measures related to certainty and severity
of punishment, e.g. the number of police in an area) on crime; and another which measures the e®ect
of perceived certainty or severity of punishment on crime. Most studies of the former type conclude
that deterrence e®ects are important while studies of the latter type provide mixed results.1
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1Studies using actual police, arrest, or punishment measures include Blumestein, et al. (1978), Cameron (1988),
Ehrlich (1973,1981), Grogger (1991), Levitt (1997, 1998a, 1998b), Myers (1983), Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger (1994),
1It is worth noting that many of the perceptions-based studies do not necessarily measure the e®ects
of beliefs on actual criminal outcomes. Instead, they often measure di®erences in intentions to commit
crime or the likelihood that someone will engage in crime given a set of circumstances surrounding an
opportunity (e.g. Tittle (1977), Klepper and Nagin (1989), Grasmick and Bursick (1990), Bachman,
Paternoster, and Ward (1992), Nagin (1993), and Paternoster and Simpson (1996)). Unfortunately,
the vast di®erences in design across studies { studies vary substantially in sample population, types
of criminal activity examined, measures of crime (actual behavior, intentions, or likelihood), and the
nature of questions about perceptions { and the diverse ¯ndings make it di±cult to draw any strong
conclusions from perceptual studies about the e®ect of a change in the perceived probability of arrest on
actual criminal behavior. More importantly, Nagin (1998) recently notes that \While great e®ort has
been committed to analyzing the links between sanction risk perceptions and behavior, comparatively
little attention has been given to examining the origins of risk perceptions and their connection to
actual sanction policy."2
This paper makes two contributions to the perceptions-based deterrence literature using self-
reported beliefs about the probability of (one's own) arrest from two sources of longitudinal data
(the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort, NLSY97, and the National Youth Survey,
NYS). First, this paper examines which factors in°uence individual perceptions about the probability
of arrest. In particular, we study (i) the correlation between various demographic characteristics (e.g.
race and ethnicity) and beliefs about the probability of arrest, (ii) the correlation between local o±cial
arrest rates and perceptions, (iii) the role of neighborhood conditions in determining beliefs, and (iv)
the role of new information and belief updating in determining perceptions about the probability of
arrest. Regarding the last point, this paper shows that individuals update their beliefs in rational
ways. Those who engage in crime while avoiding arrest reduce their perceived probability of arrest,
while those who are arrested increase their perceived probability.3 Beliefs also respond to changes in
the criminal and arrest histories of their siblings, but not to information about other random persons.
Trumbull (1989), Waldfogel (1993), and Witte (1980). Deterrence studies using perceived measures of certainty or
severity include Tittle (1977), Paternoster, et al, (1983), Piliavin, et al., (1986), Viscusi (1986), Klepper and Nagin
(1989), Grasmick and Bursick (1990), Schneider and Ervin (1990), Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward (1992), Nagin
(1993), and Paternoster and Simpson (1996).
2Exceptions include Richards and Tittle (1981), Saltzman, et al. (1982), Paternoster, et al. (1983, 1985), Piliavin, et
al. (1986), and Horney and Marshall (1992).
3Criminologists studying the link between perceptions and crime have reported that individuals engaged in crime
tend to lower their perceived probability of arrest, referring to these e®ects as `experiential e®ects' (Minor and Harry,
1982, Paternoster, et al., 1983, Piliavin, et al., 1986, Saltzman, et al., 1982). Horney and Marshall (1992) estimate a
positive correlation between arrests per crime in recent years and current beliefs, but they cannot determine whether that
correlation is due to belief updating or a strong correlation between initial (and, perhaps, stable) beliefs and observed
outcomes. Studying 300 college students, Paternoster, et al. (1985) o®er some evidence that changes in the perceived
probability of arrest are negatively correlated with criminal activity and positively correlated with formal sanctions.
None of these studies take into account the endogeneity of criminal behavior.
2The second main contribution of the paper is an empirical analysis of the relationship between the
perceived probability of arrest and the subsequent commission of crime. By examining the relationship
about the perceived probability of arrest for di®erent crimes and the probability of actual commission
of those crimes in large random national samples of young males, the results can be interpreted as
actual deterrence e®ects that might be expected when beliefs are changed through policy intervention.
Consistent with deterrence theory, estimates suggest that individuals with a higher perceived proba-
bility of arrest are less likely to commit crime in the future. Di®erences in behavior across individuals
are, therefore, not only due to di®erences in tastes for crime, criminal returns, or opportunity costs.
They may also be related to di®erences in beliefs about the criminal justice system. Additional esti-
mates suggest that an arrest not only increases the future perceived probability of arrest but it also
reduces the number of crimes committed by an individual in the future. This suggests that changes
in beliefs due to an arrest may deter future crime, which is consistent with a theory based on speci¯c
deterrence.
Understanding the evolution of beliefs is important for analyzing a number of social and economic
decisions. Given our context, it is useful to focus on the role of beliefs in theories of crime. Sah
(1991) provides a theoretical analysis of crime based on a model in which individual beliefs about the
probability of punishment are determined by the number of people they observe committing crime
and their arrest rates. His theory suggests interesting dynamic responses to changes in criminal
enforcement policy as well as levels of segregation. This paper outlines a complementary framework
for analyzing how an individual's own crime and arrest history a®ects his beliefs and how those beliefs
a®ect behavior.4 Individuals with similar tastes and initial beliefs may follow di®erent crime paths over
their lives if they are arrested at di®erent rates (or even arrested at di®erent points in their criminal
careers). In Sah's model and the framework discussed in this paper, there are delayed responses in
criminal activity when o±cial arrest rates increase. Furthermore, even a temporary increase in arrest
rates can have long-term impacts on crime rates. The signi¯cance of these results depends on the
relevance of and information used in belief updating. While a few empirical studies5 have found that
time patterns in crime and arrests are consistent with information transmission and belief updating
among criminals, this paper directly examines the empirical importance of individual (and sibling)
crime and arrest histories as well as alternative sources of information in determining beliefs about
the probability of arrest.
4This framework is developed more formally and fully analyzed in Lochner (2002).
5Taking a VAR approach to estimating the relationship between crime, arrests, and the business cycle, Corman, Joyce,
and Lovitch (1987) ¯nd empirical evidence for both delayed e®ects of an increase in arrests on crime and for long-term
e®ects of a temporary increase in arrests. Ayres and Levitt (1998) ¯nd evidence consistent with learning among auto
thieves when Lojack (a new technology allowing police to locate stolen vehicles equipped with the system) is introduced
to some cities.
3The `broken windows' theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982) suggests that individuals are more likely
to engage in crime in neighborhoods exhibiting decay (i.e. broken windows or abandoned buildings),
because they believe they are less likely to be arrested or interfered with. Understanding the infor-
mation used in generating beliefs and how perceptions in°uence behavior is central to this theory. In
the empirical analysis below, we explore the relationship between neighborhood decay and perceptions
among young males.
The economics literature has recently begun to analyze how the evolution of beliefs over time can
a®ect aggregate outcomes. In special environments, the information cascade literature (e.g. Baner-
jee, 1992, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welsh, 1992) has shown that the aggregation of individual
decisions can lead to informational cascades and conformity when individuals possess idiosyncratic
information and gather information from others. Furthermore, Heavner and Lochner (2001) show
that policies like anti-gang initiatives or mentor programs will have heterogeneous impacts on neigh-
borhoods that di®er in the current level of gang and criminal activity. More generally, the way in
which individuals acquire information and develop expectations is important in determining outcomes
and policy e®ects in any environment; yet, little is actually known about these processes.6
After a brief discussion of the main issues involved in studying the evolution of beliefs about the
probability of arrest and criminal behavior in Section 2, this paper empirically examines these issues
using data from the NLSY97 and NYS. Section 3 summarizes the data on criminal participation and
perceptions in the NLSY97 and NYS, exploring how beliefs vary in a population of young males. The
role of belief updating is examined in Section 4, and the in°uence of beliefs about the probability of
arrest on criminal activity is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Evolution of Crime and Beliefs
This section outlines a framework for thinking about the interaction of beliefs about the probability
of arrest and criminal behavior. The primary goal is to provide intuition about the important issues
involved in the empirical study below rather than a rigorous theoretical treatment of the problem.7
We also discuss a few policy implications that underscore the potential importance of belief updating
in determining criminal decisions over the lifecycle.
Suppose individuals begin with prior beliefs about the probability of arrest for di®erent types of
crime and then decide whether or not to engage in crime based on those beliefs. Their decision to
commit crime and whether they are arrested will a®ect their future beliefs about the probability of
6See Manski (1992) for a clear discussion about the importance of understanding expectations formation in studying
schooling decisions.
7For a more complete theoretical analysis, see Lochner (2002).
4arrest. Beliefs may also respond to information from various other sources. For example, individuals
may observe crimes committed by others and whether or not they are arrested, as in Sah (1991). They
may move from one neighborhood to another or observe more police on the street. Using all of this
information, individuals continually form new beliefs and decide whether or not to engage in crime.
This process repeats itself over the lifecycle. Because ex ante identical agents will receive di®erent
information about the probability of arrest, their beliefs and criminal behavior will likely di®er at any
point in time.
First, consider the decision to commit crime when there is uncertainty about the probability of
arrest. Following Becker (1968), assume that individuals choose to commit crime if the expected
bene¯ts exceed the expected costs. For simplicity, assume the bene¯ts to each individual i from
committing a crime at age t, Bit, are known beforehand. Individuals also know the punishment,
Jit ¸ 0, associated with an arrest, but they do not necessarily know their own probability of arrest.
Instead, they have some beliefs about that probability (¼i). Let the cumulative distribution function
F(¼jHt
i) represent an individual's perceived distribution of his own arrest probability conditional on
information available to him at date t, Ht
i. Assuming no intertemporal e®ects of arrest or criminal






For simplicity, this decision rule ignores any incentive to commit crime in order to learn more about the
true probability. In this sense, individuals behave myopically each period.8 De¯ning the bene¯t-cost
ratio, Rit = Bit=Jit, yields the following decision rule for crime:
commit crime if and only if E(¼jHt







Now, consider the evolution of beliefs. Assume that initial beliefs about the probability of arrest are
given by F0(¼) (where F0(0) = 0 and F0(1) = 1, re°ecting the fact that ¼ is itself a probability). Any
number of assumptions can be made about how individuals update their beliefs given new information
as well as what types of information are relevant for belief updating. Since the criminal decision rule
in equation (1) depends on the expectation of the probability of arrest, E(¼jHt
i), we consider how this
measure of beliefs evolves.
Beliefs about the probability of arrest are likely to depend on an individual's own (past) criminal
behavior and arrest outcomes, the criminal and arrest outcomes of others around him, and more
8Incorporating this type of strategic behavior is straightforward and would create an additional incentive to engage
in crime when beliefs are uncertain.
5general signals that may come from local arrest rates or neighborhood conditions.9 Let cit be an
indicator equal to one if individual i commits a crime in period t and zero otherwise. Similarly,
let Ait be an indicator equal to one if he is arrested in period t and zero otherwise. Let ~ cit and
~ Ait represent vectors of these indicators for individuals that person i associates with. Finally, we
denote any new information about the local environment by Zit. Information accumulates according
to Ht
i = (Ht¡1




i );ci;t¡1;Ai;t¡1;~ ci;t¡1; ~ Ai;t¡1;Zi;t¡1): (2)
One might reasonably assume that the expected probability of arrest is increasing in the previous
expected probability (g1 ¸ 0).11 The expected probability of arrest should be decreasing in the number
of crimes committed (by oneself or others) holding the number of arrests constant (g2 · 0 and g4 · 0).
It also seems reasonable to assume that the total e®ect of committing a crime and getting arrested for
it should lead to an increase in the expected probability of arrest (i.e. g2+g3 ¸ 0 and g4+g5 ¸ 0). One
would also expect beliefs to be increasing in measures of the o±cial local arrest rate. Furthermore,
the `broken windows' theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982) suggests that individuals are likely to think
the probability of arrest is lower in communities in which buildings are rundown, windows are broken,
and lawlessness is rampant. An important contribution of this paper will be an empirical examination
of these assumptions.
These basic assumptions about g(¢) generate a number of interesting implications for lifecycle
criminal behavior and the evolution of beliefs. As an example, consider an individual who elects to
commit a crime. If he avoids arrest, he will unambiguously lower his perceived probability of arrest
(assuming no changes in other information). This will raise the likelihood that he commits crime the
following period. On the other hand, if he is arrested, he should raise his expected probability of arrest,
making him less likely to commit crime in the future. Thus, criminal pro¯les will be determined, in
part, by the randomness associated with an arrest. The `lucky' individual who manages to avoid an
arrest early on is more likely to continue committing crime thereafter than is the `unlucky' person who
gets arrested. Following the same line of argument, individuals with `lucky' older siblings who engage
in crime and get away with it are more likely to engage in crime themselves.
9By focusing only on information received from others, Sah (1991) neglects the important role that an individual's
own criminal and arrest history plays in shaping his own beliefs and, therefore, subsequent criminal decisions. The true
probability of arrest is, most probably, quite heterogeneous across individuals. If this type of heterogeneity is substantial,
it may imply that information acquired from others plays little role in the development of an individual's beliefs about
the probability that he himself will be arrested. Instead, his own history would be the primary determinant.
10A more general rule would allow E(¼jH
t






11We denote the partial derivative of g(¢) with respect to its kth argument by gk.
6Much more can be said about the evolution of beliefs and crime if we are willing to make stronger
assumptions about the structure of information and updating. For example, consider Bayesian deci-
sionmakers who only acquire information about the probability of arrest from their own criminal and


























is the variance of beliefs about the probability of
arrest given history Ht¡1
i .
Those not committing crime will not change their beliefs, but those choosing to commit a crime will
update their beliefs depending on whether or not they are arrested. The expected probability of arrest
increases among those who are arrested, while it decreases among those who are not. The magnitude
of the change depends on both the variance and mean of the belief distribution. When there is a lot
of uncertainty (i.e. V (¼jHt¡1
i ) is high), the expected probability of arrest changes a lot in response
to new information (whether that new information comes from an arrest or the lack of an arrest).
This variance is likely to be particularly high early in an individual's life, while it should decline as
an individual acquires more and more information. This implies that the beliefs of young criminals
should respond more to an arrest than should the beliefs of veteran criminals. Additionally, individuals
should learn quickly about the probability of arrest for crimes that are committed frequently. At any
given age, then, individuals should respond less to new information about the probability of arrest for
these crimes.
The responsiveness to an arrest or non-arrest also depends on the previous expected probability
of arrest. When this expected probability (E(¼jHt¡1
i )) is high, individuals will show little response
to an arrest while they will substantially reduce their expected probability if they avoid an arrest.
On the other hand, when the expected probability of an arrest is low, individuals that are arrested
will substantially revise their probability of arrest upward, while those that are not will revise their
expected probability downward by much less. Current beliefs, therefore, determine the importance of
new information.
In this environment, there is no reason to think that beliefs will be accurate. Criminals are likely to
be optimistic in that they will tend to believe that their probability of arrest is lower than it actually is,
while non-criminals will tend to be pessimistic about their chances of evading arrest. This is even true
among those who start their criminal careers with unbiased prior beliefs. To understand why, suppose
that all individuals begin with unbiased priors. Any change in beliefs, therefore, leads to a bias. Since
12Alternatively, individuals may receive information from other sources, but it may be largely irrelevant due to the
idiosyncratic nature of criminal ability.
7individuals only commit crime if the expected probability is low enough, those who continue to engage
in crime tend to be the lucky ones who have not been arrested for their past crimes. On average,
they reduce their perceived probability of arrest leading to a systematic downward bias. At the other
extreme, those choosing not to commit crime are likely to have started out with a very high perceived
probability of arrest or to have experienced an arrest sometime in the past causing them to revise
their beliefs upwards. The latter subgroup of current non-criminals (but former criminals) will bias
the average beliefs of all non-criminals upwards. With homogeneity in the true probability of arrest
and unbiased prior beliefs, we would expect that, on average, criminals under-estimate the o±cial
arrest rate while non-criminals over-estimate the o±cial arrest rate. Beliefs in the entire population
should be relatively accurate; though, there may be some bias.
When there is heterogeneity in the true probability of arrest across individuals, average beliefs
about the probability of arrest will tend to be higher than o±cial arrest rates even if prior beliefs are
unbiased for each individual. This is because those with high true probabilities (and, therefore, high
prior beliefs about the probability) will not engage in crime. The opposite is true for those with low
true and perceived probabilities. O±cial arrest rates will be lower than the average true probability
across all individuals, since they only re°ect the probability of arrest for those choosing to commit a
crime. The biases in beliefs discussed earlier will arise among non-criminals and criminals, but the
overall average belief about the probability of arrest will generally be higher than the o±cial arrest
rate due to selection into criminality. The greater the heterogeneity in true probabilities, the greater
will be the di®erence between average beliefs and o±cial arrest rates.
If we continue to assume that individual beliefs only depend on policy-invariant priors and individ-
ual crime and arrest histories so g6 = 0 (e.g. individuals either do not hear about policy changes or do
not believe such announcements), then two policy implications contrast sharply with those predicted
by standard models that assume the true probability of arrest is known with certainty. First, an
increase in the true probability of arrest (e.g. an increase in the number of police or more lax rules
on police searches) will have no immediate e®ect on crime, but it will have lagged e®ects. This is
true of both permanent and temporary changes. Policy a®ects are lagged because they only a®ect
crime indirectly through beliefs, which take time to evolve. Each additional arrest that occurs as a
result of the increased true probability of arrest will cause the a®ected criminal to revise his perceived
probability of arrest upwards. This increases the likelihood that he refrains from committing further
crimes in the future. Even with a direct announcement e®ect on beliefs, the long-run e®ects of an
increase in the probability of arrest would be greater than the short-run e®ects. On the other hand,
when the probability of arrest is known with certainty, all e®ects on crime would be immediate and
8would only continue as long as actual arrest rates remain high.13
Second, changes in the true probability of arrest should not only a®ect the level of crime, but
they should also a®ect the age-crime pro¯le as criminals slowly learn about any changes through
experience. To the extent that initial criminal decisions only depend on prior beliefs and tastes, there
will be no impact of an increase in the true probability of arrest on the initial crime rate of a cohort.
But, subsequent crime rates will decline as more and more individuals experience an arrest. Overall,
crime should decline more quickly with age (at least initially). With direct announcement e®ects on
initial beliefs, crime rates would also decline among youth, o®setting some of the learning e®ect. This
learning e®ect is entirely absent in standard models with fully-informed agents.
Summarizing, this framework suggests that incorporating beliefs about the likelihood of arrest in
a criminal choice model can lead to interesting dynamic responses to changes in the probability of
arrest that are frequently ignored. Additionally, it explains why criminals may be optimistic about
their chances of evading arrest when non-criminals are pessimistic. It also suggests that the average
perceived probability of arrest is likely to be greater than o±cial arrest rates even when prior beliefs
are unbiased. The importance of these e®ects will depend on the information acquired by individuals
as well as the process by which they update their beliefs. In the following sections, we empirically
examine these issues.
3 Crime and Perceptions
Crime and Beliefs in the NLSY97
The NLSY97 contains a sample of 9,022 individuals (4,621 males) ages 12-16 in 1997. While the annual
survey is ongoing, only a panel for 1997-2000 is currently available. Information relevant to this study
includes data on family background, individual achievement test scores, neighborhood characteristics,
criminal behavior, and perceptions about the probability of arrest and various punishments for auto
theft.14
The extent of criminal activity among young males in the NLSY97 is shown in Table 1. About
5.5% of young males report committing a theft of over $50 in any given year, with blacks reporting
the most involvement and whites the least. Slightly more than 1% of the sample reports committing
13The criminal justice literature commonly refers to two distinct types of deterrence: general and speci¯c. General
deterrence refers to the e®ects of criminal justice policy through general policy announcements or overall arrest proba-
bilities, while speci¯c deterrence refers to deterrence achieved through an individual's own interaction with the justice
system. The latter is emphasized here.
14Speci¯cally, the survey asks: \What is the percent chance you would be arrested if you stole a car?" It also asks
three separate questions about the outcome of arrest: \Suppose you were arrested for stealing a car, what is the percent
chance that you would [be released by the police without charges or dismissed at court, pay a ¯ne and be released, serve
time in jail]?"
9auto theft. Approximately 8% of all young males report an arrest for some o®ense in any year, and
only 1.7% report an arrest for theft.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to determine what category or type of theft for which
an arrest was made. To the extent that most arrests occur for thefts of something worth more than
$50, we can approximate the arrest rate for theft by race/ethnicity. Between 0.28 (hispanics) and
0.36 (blacks) individuals report an arrest (for theft) for every individual who reports having stolen
something worth more than $50. A better measure for an arrest rate is given at the bottom of the
table, which reports the total number of arrests for theft per reported theft of more than $50. These
rates range from 0.06 for hispanics to 0.12 for blacks. According to these ¯gures, about one out of
every ten thefts of greater than $50 results in an arrest, and there is little di®erence in arrest rates
between whites and minorities. A number of caveats should be noted. First, some individuals may be
arrested even though they have not committed a theft { this would bias arrest rates upward. Second,
some arrests may be for thefts of less than $50 in value, again biasing these estimates upward. Third,
both arrests and crimes are self-reported, both of which may be under-reported. To the extent that
individuals under-report crimes more than arrests, these estimates will be biased upward. Unless
arrests are substantially under-reported compared to actual thefts of greater than $50, these arrest
rates should over-estimate true arrest probabilities among those choosing to steal.
While these rates are substantially lower than o±cial clearance rates15 for burglary, larceny-theft,
and motor-vehicle theft, they accurately re°ect o±cial arrest rates for theft after adjusting for non-
reporting (to the police) by victims. Adjusted arrest rates for theft are lowest for the general larceny-
theft category (5.4%), slightly higher for burglary (7.6%), and highest for motor vehicle theft (10.0%).16
Thus, arrest rates for theft among youth surveyed by the NLSY97 closely correspond to o±cial na-
tionwide arrest rates.
Beliefs about the probability of arrest are likely to depend not only on enforcement variables but
also on the ability of an individual to evade detection. In studying beliefs about the likelihood of
arrest, it is, therefore, important to consider individual characteristics which might be correlated with
criminal abilities as well as those which may a®ect opinions about law enforcement. Figure 1 shows the
kernel density estimated (using a biweight kernel with a bandwidth of 5) distribution of the perceived
probability of arrest for auto theft among young males in the NLSY97. Most youth report much higher
perceived probabilities of arrest than is re°ected in national arrest rates or in the actual arrest rates
15An o®ense is `cleared by arrest' when at least one person is: (1) arrested; (2) charged with the commission of the
o®ense; and (3) turned over to the court for prosecution.
16Arrests, o®enses known to the police, and clearance rates are taken from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, while
reporting rates to the police are given by the Bureau of U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Victimization in the United
States.
10for thefts committed by this sample.17 The ¯gure shows strong focal points at probabilities of 0, 0.5,
0.75, 0.9, and 1.
Young males from all racial and ethnic backgrounds tend to report a relatively high probability of
arrest as shown in Table 2. While most previous research has shown that o±cial arrest rates do not
vary across races (Tonry, 1995), popular discussion might cause one to think that minorities believe
they are more likely to face arrest and serious punishment. This does not appear to be the case here.18
Panel (A) of the table shows that both young black (52%) and hispanic (54%) males tend to have
signi¯cantly lower perceived probabilities of arrest for auto theft than the average young white male
(64%).
The fact that perceived probabilities of arrest are substantially higher than true arrest rates does
not necessarily imply that individuals over-estimate their own probability of arrest. As noted earlier,
individuals that engage in crime may face substantially lower arrest probabilities than those who
do not. While this can explain some of the gap between perceptions and actual arrest rates, even
young males engaged in crime report fairly high probabilities of arrest. Panel (B) of Table 2 reveals
probabilities for young males who reported stealing something worth more than $50 in the previous
year; panel (C) shows perceptions for young males who committed auto theft; and panel (D) calculates
average perceived probabilities using the number of thefts of over $50 committed in the last year by
each individual to weight the observations. Panel (D) accounts for the possibility that individuals
who commit the most crime also hold the lowest perceived probabilities of arrest. If each individual's
perceived probability is correct, the weighted average of all perceived probabilities for arrest in panel
(D) should equal the sample arrest rate.
Among teenage males who have stolen something worth more than $50, whites believe that their
probability of facing arrest is about 10% higher than hispanics or blacks. Among auto thieves, the
gap between whites and the two minorities is around 7%. Weighting beliefs by the number of thefts
suggests a gap of about 6%. There is little evidence to support the proposition that young blacks and
hispanics feel discriminated against in terms of facing higher arrest rates for auto theft.
In general, teenage males that are more involved in crime tend to predict better chances of evading
arrest. As discussed in the previous section, these di®erences in beliefs can be attributed to at least two
potential factors: (1) individuals who hold optimistic views about their chances of success (perhaps,
because they have successfully avoided arrest in the past) should be more likely to commit crime,
17In summarizing a number of studies on perceptions in various contexts, Viscusi (1998) reports that individuals tend
to overestimate the risk of low probability events, which is consistent with these ¯ndings.
18From a di®erent perspective, police may discriminate against minorities by failing to pursue perpetrators who vic-
timize them. Since most criminals victimize others like them, this would result in lower real and perceived arrest rates
among minorities.
11and (2) individuals who are better at evading arrest (and truly face lower probabilities of arrest and
punishment) can be expected to commit crime at higher rates. It is also the case that individuals not
engaged in crime have little incentive to ¯gure out the true probability while those engaged in crime
should have more accurate views since such information is crucial for their `work'; however, there is
little reason to expect that this should bias beliefs in one direction or the other. Given the ¯rst factor,
it is surprising that even those engaged in auto theft report an average expected arrest rate of 40-50%.
An obvious explanation for the discrepancy in beliefs and true arrest rates is that individuals mis-
interpret the question.19 Rather than reporting an arrest rate, individuals may respond by reporting
the probability that someone who engages in auto theft (perhaps repeatedly) will ever be arrested for
that crime. Indeed, this measure for an `arrest rate' (dividing the total number of individuals arrested
for theft by the number of individuals stealing something worth more than $50) is much higher (30%
for the entire sample) as seen in Table 1. Alternatively, individuals may report the probability of
arrest for stealing a representative (or random) car, while they only choose to steal cars that o®er a
substantially lower probability of arrest. In this case, reported arrest probabilities would be greater
than the o±cial arrest rate. It is impossible to know for sure how people interpret and answer these
questions. To the extent that these measures of beliefs change in response to new information and
a®ect behavior in economically interesting ways, it seems likely that they contain important (if noisy)
information about true beliefs. Ultimately, this is an empirical question, which we explore in detail.
Table 3 uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the importance of county-level
arrest rates, individual characteristics, family background, and geographic variables in explaining the
perceived probability of arrest for auto theft. While the reported results are based on the entire
sample of NLSY97 respondents, the results are very similar when restricted to those reporting a
theft of something worth more than $50 sometime in the previous year. Column (i) examines the
relationship between county arrest rates for motor vehicle theft20 and the perceived probability of
arrest. The estimates suggest a positive correlation with a coe±cient of 0.13. Column (ii) adds
demographic indicators for age and race. The coe±cient on local arrest rates drops by half, suggesting
that much of the correlation between beliefs and o±cial arrest rates is due to locational di®erences in
demographics that are correlated with beliefs. Column (iii) adds an indicator for current residence in a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The e®ects of county arrest rates decline further, but MSA status
is statistically important. Young males living in an MSA believe they are less likely to be arrested,
19However, examining responses to a variety of questions about the probability of di®erent events occurring in the near
future, Walker (2000) ¯nds little evidence that NLSY97 youth are unable to grasp the concept of probability.
20County arrest rates are computed from the ratio of arrests per person divided by crimes per person in each county
from the following source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
PROGRAM DATA [UNITED STATES]: COUNTY-LEVEL DETAILED ARREST AND OFFENSE DATA, 1997-2000
[Computer ¯le]. Inter-univerisity Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI.
12consistent with lower o±cial arrest rates in urban communities. To the extent that most of the true
variation in arrest rates across communities depends on metropolitan status and the demographic
characteristics of a neighborhood, it is not surprising that the correlation between beliefs and o±cial
county arrest rates, which are undoubtedly measured with error, disappears after controlling for these
factors.
Given the theory discussed in Section 2, one might expect that older individuals are better in-
formed about the true arrest rate than are younger respondents. However, the results from including
interactions between MSA status and age as well as county arrest rates and age in the regressions
of Table 3 do not support this conclusion. Coe±cient estimates for these interactions are always in-
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. On average, beliefs do not more accurately re°ect o±cial arrest rates
among older individuals.
Column (iv) of Table 3 adds detailed family background measures (speci¯cally, low current family
income, whether the respondent lived with both his natural parents in 1997, whether his mother was a
teenager at birth) and math achievement test scores.21 This has little e®ect on the estimates already
discussed. Young black and hispanic males report a lower probability of arrest than white males even
after controlling for age, local arrest rates, residence in a MSA, and other family background measures.
However, racial di®erences are considerably smaller than their unconditional counterparts shown in
panel (A) of Table 2. Perhaps surprisingly, family background has little a®ect on reported beliefs
about the probability of arrest. Other than race/ethnicity, only the e®ects of Peabody Individual
Achievement Test (PIAT) scores for math are statistically signi¯cant. In contrast to an `ability to
evade' arrest hypothesis, a 10% higher math PIAT score is associated with a 1.2% higher perceived
chance of arrest.
The considerable variation in beliefs is not well explained by these rich measures of family back-
ground, geographic location, local arrest rates, age, race, and ability { the R2 statistics for these
regressions are no greater than 0.03. Yet, perceptions are fairly stable over time as seen in Figure 2,
which shows the distribution of changes in the perceived probability of arrest from one year to the
next (using kernel density estimation with a biweight kernel and bandwidth of 5). More than 25% of
respondents do not change their beliefs about the probability of arrest between any two years. The
correlation in perceptions between years is roughly 0.32.
21Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) scores for math are only observed for individuals with less than 10
years of schooling{nearly everyone age 16 in 1997. To maintain the representativeness of the sample, all individuals age
16 in 1997 are dropped from regressions including PIAT scores, making the sample representative of males ages 12-15 in
1997. The large decline in sample size associated with speci¯cation (iv) is primarily due to the inclusion of PIAT scores
and family income, both of which are missing for a sizeable fraction of the sample.
13Crime and Beliefs in the NYS
The NYS contains a random sample of 1,725 individuals (918 males) ages 11-17 in 1976. Respondents
were surveyed annually from 1976-1980, then again in 1983 and 1986. This paper focuses on the
perceptions and criminal behavior of men as reported in the 1983 and 1986 surveys (earlier surveys
do not contain information about perceptions of the criminal justice system).22 Data regarding family
background and some neighborhood characteristics are available.
Table 4 reports the extent of selected criminal activities and arrest records from 1984 to 1986.
Since most individuals are in their early twenties during these years, criminal participation is much
lower than for the younger sample in the NLSY97. Yet, 18% still report stealing something worth less
than $5 over this three-year period, and 9% report physically attacking someone. Substantially fewer
individuals engage in more serious forms of theft. Nearly 12% report an arrest over the three-year
span, although many of those arrests are for minor crimes. Only 1.9 percent are arrested for a property
or violent crime.23
Sample arrest rates can be calculated from the information on criminal behavior and arrests. When
dividing the number of arrests for property crimes by the total number of break-ins and thefts greater
than $50 reported in 1983 and 1986, average arrests per property crime are slightly under 5%. A
similar arrest rate is obtained for violent crime when dividing the number of arrests for violent crime
by the reported number of times individuals used force to obtain something or attacked someone.
These arrest rates are less than o±cial arrest rates in the U.S. population adjusted for non-reporting
to the police, especially for violent crimes. (For example, 1986 arrest rates for larceny-theft were 5.5%,
burglary, 7.4%, and assault, 20.4%.) However, both the number of crimes and number of arrests in
this sample are quite small. Furthermore, the denominators are likely to be in°ated due to duplication
in reporting of crimes (e.g. some break-ins may also be reported as thefts by respondents).
Individuals were asked to report the probability (in increments of 0.1) that they would be arrested
if they were to commit various crimes.24 The distribution of reported probabilities of arrest in the
22Surveys for 1983 and 1986 actually took place early in 1984 and 1987, respectively. Perceptions questions, therefore,
refer to beliefs at the beginning of 1984 and 1987. Criminal participation (and most other) questions explicitly ask
about the calendar years 1983 and 1986, however. Additionally, the survey taken in early 1987 also asked retrospective
questions about criminal participation in 1984 and 1985. In many cases, categorical measures rather than the actual
number of crimes committed in a year are reported (especially for 1984 and 1985). In these cases, the number of crimes
committed was imputed from the average number of crimes committed among those in that category who reported the
actual number of crimes.
23Arrests for property crimes include various forms of theft, evading payment, burglary, breaking and entering, and
dealing in stolen goods. Arrests for violent crimes include assault, robbery, and harassment. Other arrests include crimes
such as prostitution, vagrancy, panhandling, etc.
24Speci¯cally, the survey asks ¯ve distinct questions:\Suppose YOU were to [steal something worth $5 or less, steal
something worth more than $50, break into a building or vehicle to steal something or just to look around, use force
(strongarm methods) to get money or things from other people, attack someone with the idea of seriously hurting or
killing him/her]. What are the chances you would be ticketed/arrested?"
14NYS is shown in Figure 3. Table 5 reports average perceived probabilities of arrest in the NYS for four
crimes: stealing something worth $5 or less, stealing something worth more than $50, breaking into a
building or vehicle, and attacking someone to hurt or kill them. As with teenage boys in the NLSY97,
perceived arrest rates are higher than o±cial arrest rates in the U.S. But, the ranking of crimes
by perceived arrest probability from most to least likely corresponds to the ranking of actual arrest
rates across crime types. Interestingly, black and hispanic men in the NYS report higher perceived
arrest probabilities for property crimes than do white men, in sharp contrast to the NLSY97 ¯ndings.
However, the di®erences by race are small for all but petty theft.25
Table 6 examines whether perceptions vary across criminals and non-criminals. Speci¯cally, the
¯rst column reports perceived probabilities for those who did not commit the crime in question,
while the second column reports perceived probabilities for those who did. The ¯nal column weights
perceived probabilities by the number of times an individual reported committing that type of crime.
As with the teenage boys in the NLSY97, those committing any particular crime tend to believe their
chance of arrest for that crime is lower than those not engaging in that type of crime. Weighting
beliefs by the number of crimes lowers perceived probabilities even more for all crimes except petty
theft. Regardless of the sample, perceived probabilities of arrest are high compared to average arrest
rates in the U.S.
The e®ects of age, race, family background, neighborhood conditions, and urban status on percep-
tions among young men are estimated using OLS and reported in Table 7. (Ordered probits produce
similar conclusions.) Even after controlling for other background characteristics, blacks hold a signi¯-
cantly higher perceived probability of arrest than whites for petty theft, but not for other crimes. Men
who grew up in intact families and have more educated mothers or fathers think that their likelihood of
arrest is lower on average, although the di®erences are quite small and generally statistically insignif-
icant. Consistent with o±cial arrest patterns, men in rural areas hold higher perceived probabilities
of arrest than those in urban communities.26
The `broken windows' theory of Kelling and Wilson (1982) assumes that local neighborhood con-
ditions a®ect individual perceptions about the likelihood of arrest and/or punishment and that those
perceptions, in part, determine criminal behavior. The small and insigni¯cant coe±cients on neigh-
borhood crime and disarray fail to support this theory. Instead, the estimates suggest that young men
living in neighborhoods in which crime and `broken windows' are a problem do not view their chances
25Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine whether di®erences across the NYS and NLSY97 sample are due to
di®erences in time period (mid-1980s vs. late 1990s), di®erences in the types of crimes studied, or di®erences in respon-
dents' age (early to mid-teens vs. mid-twenties). Racial di®erences in beliefs do not appear to di®er dramatically by age,
suggesting that the latter reason may not be too important.
26State and county of residence are unknown in the NYS, so perceptions cannot be compared with local o±cial arrest
rates as in the NLSY97.
15of arrest any di®erently from those living in cleaner and more orderly environments. We re-examine
this issue below.
The substantial heterogeneity in beliefs is not well explained by rich background and neighborhood
characteristics. As in the NLSY97, perceptions are largely idiosyncratic and di±cult to explain; yet,
they are also stable. Figure 4 shows the distribution of changes in beliefs from 1983 to 1986 for the
sample. For each crime, about 20% of the young men do not change their perceived probability of
arrest. About 60% change their perceived probability by twenty percent or less over three years. Only
10% of the young men revise their probabilities up or down by more than ¯fty percent for any given
crime. Correlations between 1983 and 1986 perceptions are typically around one-third. We now turn
to the issue of belief updating.
4 Information-Based Belief Updating
This section empirically studies factors that may cause individuals to change their beliefs about the
probability of arrest. In the NLSY and NYS, we observe a single reported measure of the perceived
probability of arrest, pi;t, which we assume relates to E(¼jHt¡1
i ) from Section 2. The simple Bayesian
structure above (see equation 3) suggests estimating the relationship between changes in perceptions
and changes in environmental factors Zi;t (e.g. local arrest rates, metropolitan status, neighborhood
characteristics, etc.), new arrests Ai;t¡1 and crimes committed ci;t¡1 (both taking place between period
t ¡ 1 and t) by the respondent as well as his siblings, ~ Ai;t¡1 and ~ ci;t¡1:
¢pi;t = ¢Zi;t° + ÁAi;t¡1 + ¸ci;t¡1 + Ás ~ Ai;t¡1 + ¸s~ ci;t¡1 + »i;t: (4)
A more general structure of updating can also be estimated as follows:
pi;t = Xi¯ + Zi;t° + µpi;t¡1 + ÁAi;t¡1 + ¸ci;t¡1 + Ás ~ Ai;t¡1 + ¸s~ ci;t¡1 + "i;t; (5)
which allows for permanent individual-speci¯c characteristics Xi (e.g. ability, race, family background
etc.) and relaxes the implicit assumption of the Bayesian model that µ = 1. With jµj < 1 and Zi;t = Z¤
i
constant, beliefs would eventually converge to a steady state
p¤
i(Xi;Z¤







if the individual and his siblings stopped committing crime and were never arrested again (ignoring
changes in "i;t). Here, an individual's Xi characteristics determine his steady state level of beliefs.
Changes in Zi;t characteristics will change steady state beliefs, perhaps through information gathered
from others or from observing changes in local conditions. For example, moving to a new city or
16neighborhood may cause an individual to gradually shift his beliefs toward thinking the probability of
arrest is higher or lower than previously thought, even if he does not engage in crime or face an arrest.
Equation (5) can be re-written as
pi;t = (1 ¡ µ)p¤
i(Xi;Zi;t¡1) + µpi;t¡1 + ¢Zi;t° + ÁAi;t¡1 + ¸ci;t¡1 + Ás ~ Ai;t¡1 + ¸s~ ci;t¡1 + "i;t;
which shows that µ determines the rate at which beliefs move toward their steady state level. A µ near
zero implies that beliefs quickly converge to their steady state level given any new information. This
implies that any observed changes a®ecting beliefs (e.g. an arrest or non-arrest) have short-lasting
e®ects as an individual's beliefs quickly return to their steady state level. This would be the case if
individuals continually receive strong signals (unobserved by the econometrician) that their probability
of arrest is p¤
i. Or, it may simply imply that individuals have short memories and quickly return to
some baseline belief about their own probability of arrest.
With at least three periods of data, we can allow for unobserved individual ¯xed e®ects: "i;t =





i ; ~ At
i;~ ct
i) = 0 8t = 2;:::;T; (6)
where xt
i = (xi1;xi2;:::;xit) for x = p;Z;A;c; ~ A;~ c. This assumes that p, A, c, ~ A, and ~ c are `pre-
determined', while Z is `strictly exogenous'. As Arellano and Honore (2001) show, the assumption of
equation (6) is fairly weak in that it does not rule out feedback e®ects of lagged dependent variables or
disturbances on current and future values of the `pre-determined' variables. That is, by conditioning
on ct¡1
i and At¡1
i (rather than cT
i and AT
i ) in equation (6), we explicitly allow for the fact that ci;t
and Ai;t (as well all future values of crime and arrests) may depend on the disturbance ºi;t. This is
important, because we expect that crime depends on current beliefs about the probability of arrest {
an issue we will examine more closely in the following section.27
For
¢ºi;t = ¢pi;t ¡ µ¢pi;t¡1 ¡ ¢Zi;t° ¡ Á¢Ai;t¡1 ¡ ¸¢ci;t¡1 ¡ Ás¢ ~ Ai;t¡1 ¡ ¢¸s~ ci;t¡1;
we estimate the general model with ¯xed e®ects using GMM with the following moments:
E[pi;t¡2¢ºi;t] = 0;
E[Zi;s¢ºi;t] = 0 8s 2 ft;t ¡ 1g;
E[Ai;s¢ºi;t] = 0 8s 2 ft ¡ 2;t ¡ 3g;
27As long as the disturbances ºi;t are idosyncratic across individuals, there is little reason to expect that they will
a®ect the current criminal decisions and arrests of siblings. We, therefore, condition on ~ c
t
i and ~ A
t
i. The conclusions are
similar if we treat sibling crime and arrests in the same way we treat own crime and arrests.
17E[ci;s¢ºi;t] = 0 8s 2 ft ¡ 2;t ¡ 3g;
E[ ~ Ai;s¢ºi;t] = 0 8s 2 ft ¡ 1;t ¡ 2g;
E[~ ci;s¢ºi;t] = 0 8s 2 ft ¡ 1;t ¡ 2g:
These moment restrictions are applied for t equal to 1999 and 2000.28 (See Arellano and Honore
(2001) for a comprehensive discussion of estimation with panel data and ¯xed e®ects.)
Table 8 reports estimates related to belief updating in the NLSY97 for the following: (A) OLS
regression for the di®erence equation (4); (B) OLS regression for the quasi-di®erence equation (5);
and (C) GMM for the quasi-di®erence equation (5) accounting for individual ¯xed e®ects. Each
panel reports two speci¯cations. The ¯rst includes indicators for whether the individual or his male
siblings committed crime or were arrested (for a violent or property crime) between survey dates. The
second includes indicators for the actual number of times individuals and their siblings committed
crimes and were arrested.29 Measures based on sibling crimes and arrests refer to male siblings who
are also in the main NLSY97 sample. As a result, their ages are always within a few years of the
respondent.30 In general, all columns but the last show strong evidence of belief updating in response
to the respondent's own criminal history. Individuals who reported stealing something worth more
than $50 or selling drugs were likely to report a lower perceived probability of arrest (conditional on
prior beliefs and the arrest outcome) in the next survey year. Those arrested for a theft increased
their perceived probability. The e®ects of at least one crime and the e®ects of arrest on perceptions
are statistically signi¯cant (at the 10% level{most at the 5% level) in all but the ¯nal column. As
shown at the bottom of Table 8, a joint F-test of whether the coe±cients on all individual crime and
arrest variables are zero is strongly rejected in most speci¯cations.
The e®ects of sibling crime and arrests are less precisely estimated given that only 27% of the
respondents have at least one sibling that is also in the NLSY97 sample. Still, a number of coe±cient
estimates on measures of sibling crime are statistically signi¯cant and negative, as expected. The
28It is possible to use these moments for t equal to 1999, since crime and arrest measures in each survey year apply
to the previous period, pre-dating perceptions measures. Thus, for t equal to 1999, we can use perceptions in the 1999
survey as pi;t and crime and arrest measures from the 1997 and 1998 surveys as measures for t¡2 and t¡3 (corresponding
to crime and arrests taking place in 1996 and 1997). It is possible to use further lags for Z, ~ A, and ~ c; however, conditional
on the lags already used, little would be gained and problems with weak instruments may arise.
29Ideally, we would use measures for the crime of auto theft and arrests for auto theft in our updating speci¯cations,
but auto thefts are rarely observed in the NLSY97 data and arrests for auto theft cannot be identi¯ed. Assuming beliefs
about the probability of arrest are positively correlated across crimes { in the NYS, correlations in beliefs about the
probability of arrest across crimes range from a low of 0.33 between attack and minor thefts to a high of 0.69 between
minor and major thefts { we should expect beliefs about the probability of arrest for auto theft to change in response to
other crimes and arrests.
30Though not reported, speci¯cations controlling for the number of siblings present in the household show nearly
identical results { there is little e®ect of household size on beliefs. Also, estimates are qualitatively similar when using a
restricted sample of individuals who reported a theft of greater than $50 in at least one of the previous two years.
18estimated e®ects of a sibling's arrest are generally not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Joint F-tests
for whether the sibling crime and arrest coe±cients are zero is rejected (at the 5% level) in half
of the speci¯cations. Alternatively, a joint F-test for whether the coe±cients on sibling crimes and
arrests equal the corresponding coe±cients on respondent crime and arrests cannot be rejected for any
speci¯cation.
The most noticeable di®erence between the OLS and GMM estimates of equation (5) is the change
in the estimated coe±cient on the previous measure of beliefs. After controlling for ¯xed e®ects, the
autocorrelation in the perceived probability of arrest (µ) drops from 0.3 to below 0.04. Heterogeneity
in unobserved ¯xed e®ects, ¹i, across individuals implies idiosyncratic variation in steady state levels
of beliefs. The fact that µ is estimated to be quite small when ¯xed e®ects are included suggests that
any deviation from an individual's steady state level of beliefs in response to new information (e.g. an
arrest or non-arrest) fades out very quickly. So, an arrest may reduce the perceived probability for a
year or so, but it has little lasting e®ect on beliefs.
A more limited analysis is performed using young men in the NYS. Because the NYS only records
beliefs for two periods, we cannot estimate the quasi-di®erence model with ¯xed e®ects using the
GMM procedure outlined earlier. In Table 9, we report estimates of equation (5) using 1983 and
1986 measures of beliefs, accounting for crimes and arrests that take place between the two surveys
(estimates of the ¯rst-di®erence speci¯cation are quite similar).31 Again, we employ two speci¯cations
for each type of crime studied. The ¯rst includes an indicator variable for whether the individual
committed the crime under study (e.g. in column 1, the indicator is one if the individual reported
stealing something worth less than $5 and zero otherwise) or was arrested for a violent or property
crime during the 1984-86 period. The second includes measures of the number of crimes committed
and arrests over that period.
As in the NLSY97, these men report lower perceived probabilities of arrest for all crime categories
at the end of 1986 if they engaged in that type of crime in 1984-86 (three of the four estimates are
statistically signi¯cant). Coe±cients on arrest are always positive, but they are only signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero for break-ins. Joint tests of whether the coe±cients on crime and arrests are zero
are rejected in nearly all of the columns. While the model above suggests that the net e®ect of a crime
and arrest should be negative, the speci¯cations with only an indicator for committing a crime and
getting arrested generally reveal a coe±cient on the indicator for crime that is larger in absolute value
than the coe±cient on the arrest indicator. This is because those who are arrested commit more than
one crime, on average. Looking at the speci¯cations controlling for the number of crimes and arrests,
31Speci¯cations also control for age, race/ethnicity, whether the individual's parents earned less than $10,000 in 1976,
and whether the individual lived with both natural parents in 1976.
19we always observe a larger coe±cient on an arrest than on a crime. Thus, the net e®ect of a crime
and arrest on the perceived probability of arrest is always positive.
It is interesting to note that using measures for any arrest rather than arrests for more serious
property and violent crimes (as in Table 9) generally produces smaller and insigni¯cant e®ects on
beliefs (except for small thefts). This suggests that police attempts to crack down on vagrancy, public
intoxication, and other petty crimes are not likely to in°uence beliefs about the probability of arrest
for more serious crimes in any signi¯cant way.
Table 9 also reports coe±cient estimates on central city status and rural residential status. The
e®ects of these measures are insigni¯cant once we control for crime and arrest histories and previous
measures of beliefs (in contrast to those in Table 7). Measures of neighborhood lawlessness and disarray
also have no signi¯cant e®ect on beliefs. Again, we ¯nd no evidence to support the `broken windows'
theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982).
While we have do not have sibling measures of beliefs or crime in the NYS, one might wonder
whether information about the arrests of other random criminals has any a®ect on beliefs as Sah's
(1991) theory would suggest. To that end, we examine whether individuals who are victimized by
a crime alter their beliefs in response. The underlying assumption here is that victims are likely to
learn whether or not the perpetrator is ever arrested. In a world in which all individuals face identical
probabilities of arrest, information as a victim should be as useful as information as a perpetrator.
Unfortunately, the data do not record whether someone was arrested for the crime, but it is reasonable
to assume that no arrest was made in most cases given the low o±cial arrest rates reported earlier.
Then, we should expect, on average, that individuals will adjust the probability of arrest downward
after a victimization.32 The estimated coe±cients on victimization are small and statistically insignif-
icant for all crimes in Table 9. While not an ideal test of information from the arrest outcomes of
others, these estimates suggest that individuals put little weight on the information provided by the
crime and arrest outcomes of random criminals. Arrest probabilities may be too individual-speci¯c to
make such information useful in determining one's own arrest probability.
Altogether, these estimates strongly suggest patterns consistent with belief updating among re-
spondents that is based on their own history of interaction with the criminal justice system. When
young men participate in crime, they tend to lower their perceived probability of arrest if they evade
arrest. If arrested, they raise their perceived probability. One could potentially explain the ¯rst
32Of course, if those who observe an arrest adjust their beliefs upward much more than those who do not observe
an arrest adjust their beliefs down, this need not be the case. Given that o±cial arrest rates range from 5-20% for the
crimes under study, those observing an arrest would have to adjust their beliefs upwards by 5 to 20 times as much as
those not observing an arrest adjust theirs downward for the e®ects to cancel. This is unlikely, given that the estimated
negative coe±cients on (own and sibling) crime measures remain signi¯cantly negative when leaving out arrest outcomes
in updating regressions (i.e. Tables 8 and 9).
20¯nding by arguing that individuals chose to commit crime between sample periods because they had
already (for some exogenous reason) lowered their perceived probabilities (but were unable to report
those new perceptions until surveyed the second time). Or, those engaged in crime could have gained
experience at crime, lowering their true (and perceived) arrest probability. However, such scenarios
cannot explain why those arrested between sample dates maintain higher perceived probabilities of
arrest at the time of the second interview. Only an information-based model of belief updating can
readily explain both ¯ndings. The fact that sibling criminal and arrest histories a®ect beliefs in a
similar way only strengthens this conclusion. The importance of an individual's own criminal and
arrest history in determining beliefs strongly supports the very simple model outlined in Section 2
and developed further in Lochner (2002). Sah's (1991) theory also ¯nds some support in that the
criminal and arrest history of an individual's siblings a®ects beliefs about the probability of arrest,
but information about arrest outcomes from other random persons does not seem to be important.
Taken together, these results suggest a limited role for learning from others.
5 The In°uence of Perceptions on Criminal Behavior
Given the considerable variation in perceptions about the probability of arrest, it is natural to question
whether individuals act di®erently based on stated beliefs. And, do they behave di®erently in periods
when they report a high perceived probability of arrest than when they report a low probability?
Rational choice theory suggests that (holding all else constant), individuals facing a higher probability
of arrest and/or punishment should commit less crime. We examine this relationship in the NLSY97
and NYS.
Assuming the bene¯t-cost ratio of crime in Section 2 is given by Ri;t = AWi;t ¡ !i;t produces the




i;t ´ AWi;t ¡ Bpi;t ¡ !i;t > 0
0 otherwise
If !i;t is iid logistic over time and across individuals, this implies a standard logit model for criminal
participation. Since perceptions cannot have been a®ected by subsequent criminal behavior (and their
arrest outcomes), we explore the e®ects of elicited perceptions on crime reported in the following
survey. This leaves us with three years of belief-crime data in the NLSY97 and a single cross-section
in the NYS.
Using maximum likelihood, we estimate this logit model for self-reported criminal participation in
both data sets. In the NLSY97, we control for age, race, ethnicity, whether or not the youth lived with
both his natural parents, whether or not the youth's mother was a teenager at birth, and math PIAT
21scores in addition to the perceived probability of arrest for auto theft. The estimated coe±cients on
the perceived probability are negative in speci¯cations for auto theft and for thefts of something worth
more than $50, suggesting that an increase of 0.1 in the perceived probability of arrest reduces the
probability of stealing a car by almost 5% and the probability of stealing something worth more than
$50 by a little more than 3%.33 As a simple check on these results, we also estimate two other logit
speci¯cations for whether or not someone smoked a cigarette or drank alcohol in the last 30 days. In
percentage terms, the e®ects of the perceived probability of arrest for auto theft are much smaller (1%
for smoking and 0.5% for drinking). This is re-assuring, since we would not expect the probability
of arrest for auto theft to be very highly correlated with the probability that these young males will
be punished for smoking or drinking. Additionally, we note that speci¯cations which also include the
county-level arrest rate produce similar ¯ndings. O±cial arrest rates have no signi¯cant impact on
participation in crime for the NLSY97 sample.
A similar approach can be taken with the NYS, examining the e®ects of beliefs in 1983 on crime
committed over the 1984-86 period. Here, we have crime-speci¯c beliefs, which we include in the logits
along with controls for age, race/ethnicity, whether the respondent lived with both natural parents
in 1976, whether parental income was below $10,000 in 1976, and rural and central city residential
status. All estimated coe±cients on the crime-speci¯c perceived probability of arrest are negative,
supporting the case for deterrence.34
It is possible that perceptions of arrest rates are correlated with more general unobserved prefer-
ences for risk and crime. Then, these estimated relationships would capture both the deterrent e®ect
of a higher perceived probability of arrest and the in°uence of unobserved tastes for crime that are
correlated with arrest probability perceptions. Two sets of results suggest that this may not be an
important problem. First, the NLSY97 ¯ndings suggest that the e®ects of beliefs about the probabil-
ity of arrest for auto theft are quite small (in percentage terms) for minor delinquent activities like
smoking and drinking { much smaller than the e®ects on theft. Second, the estimated e®ects of beliefs
on crime in the NYS remain even after controlling for parental and peer approval levels for crime as
well as the individual's own moral attitudes towards crime.35
33The coe±cient on the perceived probability of arrest in the auto theft logit is -0.485 with a standard error of 0.256,
and the corresponding coe±cient in the logit for thefts of more than $50 is -0.346 with a standard error of 0.131.
Speci¯cations which also include the perceived conditional probability of going to jail if arrested yield similar estimates
for the impact of arrest probabilities. Speci¯cations which control for the perceived unconditional probability of going
to jail (i.e. the interaction of the probability of arrest with the probability of going to jail conditional on arrest) produce
qualitatively similar results.
34The estimated coe±cient for thefts of less than $5 is -1.5 (standard error of 0.5), thefts greater than $50, -0.7 (0.7),
break-ins, -1.1 (0.9), and attacks, -1.1 (0.4).
35Speci¯cally, these speci¯cations control for whether the respondent's parents or peers would disapprove of them
stealing something and whether they themselves believe stealing is wrong.
22If one is willing to treat these estimates as the deterrent e®ect of perceived arrest probabilities, it
is possible to study the extent to which di®erences in beliefs are responsible for di®erences in criminal
participation by race or ability. The estimated 8 percentage point di®erence in perceived arrest
probabilities between whites and blacks (Table 3, column iv) implies a 3.8% higher participation rate
in auto theft by blacks. Hispanics are predicted to have a 4.2% higher participation rate in auto
theft than whites due to di®erences in perceived arrest probabilities. The predicted di®erence in auto
theft participation rates between individuals at the 75th and 25th percentiles in PIAT math scores
is 2.9%. These simple comparisons suggest that important variation in criminal participation rates
across individuals may be due to di®erences in information and beliefs.
Thus far, we have only examined the cross-sectional relationship between beliefs and criminal
behavior. Given the potential for correlation between unobserved tastes for crime and beliefs about
the probability of arrest, one would like to control for unobserved ¯xed e®ects in the criminal choice
equation. However, it is generally di±cult to estimate dynamic discrete choice models with ¯xed
e®ects when all regressors are not strictly exogenous (in our context, perceptions are predetermined
but not strictly exogenous).36 Furthermore, once ¯xed e®ects are introduced, it is no longer possible
to estimate the average e®ect of changes in the perceived probability of arrest on the probability of
committing crime.
We take a di®erent approach motivated by the model outlined in Section 2. In particular, we use
the NLSY97 to examine the e®ects of an arrest for theft, which is assumed to be random conditional
on the number of thefts of something worth more than $50, on beliefs and subsequent crime. The
model suggests that the perceived probability should increase while crime should decline among those
arrested. Matching individuals on the number of thefts, we estimate the average e®ect of an arrest
on the perceived probability of arrest for auto theft and on thefts of greater than $50 (where the
average is taken over the distribution of crimes committed by those who are arrested).37 Consistent
36A regressor is strictly exogenous if it is independent of all past, present, and future disturbances, although it may
be correlated with individual ¯xed e®ects. Predetermined regressors may be correlated with past disturbances but must
be uncorrelated with present and future disturbances. The conditional logit approach of Chamberlain (1980) and the
conditional maximum score approach of Manski (1987) require strict exogeneity of all regressors. Honore and Kyriazidou
(2000) allow for lagged dependent variables, but all other regressors must be strictly exogenous. More recently, Honore
and Lewbel (2002) do not require strictly exogenous regressors, but they require a `special' regressor with conditions that
are not well-suited to the problem at hand.
37For an outcome yit (either crimes committed in period t or the change in perceptions from period t ¡ 1 to t), we






c 2 f1;2;3;:::;¹ cg and A 2 f0;1g, where N(c;A) is the number of persons who committed c crimes and were arrested
A times in period t ¡ 1. Then, compute ¹ ¢(c) = ¹ yt(c;1) ¡ ¹ yt(c;0), the average di®erence in outcomes for those who
are arrested and those who are not given their crime level c. Finally, we compute the average e®ect (over the crime
distribution of arrestees), ¹ ¢ =
¹ c P
c=1
f(c)¹ ¢(c), where f(c) is the fraction of all arrestees who committed c crimes in period
t ¡ 1.
23with Table 8, we ¯nd that the average perceived probability of arrest increases 6.2 (standard error
of 6.7) percentage points more for those who are arrested than those who are not. We ¯nd mixed
results on crime. The probability that someone steals something worth more than $50 increases by
0.05 (standard error of 0.05), but the average number of thefts worth more than $50 decreases by 0.92
(standard error of 0.52). The latter estimate suggests that the number of crimes committed declines
in response to an increase in arrests as predicted by deterrence theory. However, it is impossible to
say whether the e®ect on crime comes through changes in beliefs about the probability of arrest or
whether an arrest causes individuals to commit less crime in subsequent years because they fear an
increase in potential punishments if they are caught again.38
6 Conclusions
Empirically, we uncover substantial heterogeneity in beliefs among young males in the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort (NLSY97) and the National Youth Survey (NYS). On average,
individual beliefs about the probability of arrest for various crimes are substantially higher than o±cial
arrest rates, and those beliefs are fairly stable across time for individuals. Perceived arrest rates are
lower, on average, among those actively engaged in crime, which is consistent with standard deter-
rence theory as well as an information-based model of belief updating. There is little evidence that
minorities believe they are more likely to be arrested than do white men, which reconciles with studies
suggesting that there is little, if any, discrimination in o±cial arrest rates across race (Tonry, 1995).
Less than 5% of the heterogeneity in beliefs can be explained by di®erences in family background,
neighborhood, or cognitive abilities.
Beliefs are correlated with county-level o±cial arrest rates and metropolitan or urban residential
status. But, contrary to the `broken windows' theory developed by Wilson and Kelling (1982), per-
ceptions are not correlated with other neighborhood conditions like general lawlessness, abandoned
buildings, or the presence of winos on the streets. Furthermore, perceptions are not signi¯cantly
a®ected by one's own criminal victimization, which might provide additional information about the
likelihood of arrest. Instead, individual beliefs about their own probability of arrest are largely id-
iosyncratic, stable, and unrelated to the local environment. It is di±cult to know whether variation in
beliefs across individuals re°ects actual variation in the true probability of arrest or simple di®erences
in beliefs. Beliefs do respond to individual-speci¯c information, however. Individuals who engage in
crime while avoiding arrest tend to reduce their perceived probability of arrest; those who are arrested
raise their perceived probability. Beliefs respond similarly to changes in the criminal and arrest ac-
38As such, arrests may not be a valid instrument for beliefs in the criminal choice equation.
24tivity of their siblings, suggesting that individuals do share information of this sort among similarly
aged family members.
Finally, we ¯nd evidence consistent with deterrence theory. Cross-sectional variation in criminal
participation is negatively correlated with beliefs about the probability of arrest, and individuals
respond to an arrest by increasing their perceived probability of arrest and scaling back their criminal
activity. Given the di±culty in analyzing this issue in the presence of unobserved tastes for crime or
risk, more research on this question certainly seems warranted.
Overall, the empirical ¯ndings support the economic model of crime and belief updating outlined in
Section 2 of this paper. Beliefs are heterogeneous and idiosyncratic. They also respond to individual
and sibling arrests and non-arrests in predictable ways. While most of the literature on criminal
deterrence assumes that individuals know true arrest rates and that an increase in those arrest rates
will immediately deter crime, this paper suggests that this may not be the case. Individuals appear
to learn about the probability of arrest as they gain more experience with the criminal justice system.
As a result, responses to changes in enforcement are likely to di®er across individuals with di®erent
crime and arrest histories, and the full impacts of any enforcement policy may not be realized for
many years.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Perceived Probability of Arrest for Auto Theft (NLSY97)
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Steal something worth < $5 Steal something worth > $50
Break in building or vehicle Attack someoneAll Blacks Hispanics Whites
Number of respondents 4,559 1,169 977 2,413
Percent who stole something worth > $50 5.45 6.37 6.31 5.09
Percent who stole a vehicle 1.20 1.31 1.77 1.06
Avg. number of thefts > $50 0.36 0.44 0.57 0.30
Avg. number of thefts > $50 (of those who stole) 6.69 7.18 9.16 5.99
Percent arrested for any offense 8.37 11.22 9.07 7.61
Percent arrested for theft 1.72 2.28 1.74 1.60
Avg. number of arrests for theft 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03
Persons arrested for theft / persons who stole > $50 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.31
Persons arrested for theft / persons who stole a vehicle 1.43 1.74 0.98 1.51
Arrests for theft / number of thefts > $50 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.09
Notes:
    All measures computed using panel sample weights.
Table 1: Annual Self-Reported Crime and Arrests Among Males in the NLSY97All Blacks Hispanics Whites
A) All Individuals 60.53 51.79 53.67 63.74
(0.48) (1.00) (1.04) (0.59)
B) Individuals who reported stealing 50.46 43.49 43.61 53.88
     something worth more than $50 (1.67) (3.57) (2.81) (2.22)
C) Individuals who reported stealing a car 44.78 40.50 39.72 47.42
(2.97) (5.82) (4.65) (4.16)
D) Weighted by number of thefts worth 39.31 35.76 35.77 41.71
      more than $50 (3.02) (6.50) (5.96) (4.09)
Notes:
Table 2: Average Perceived Probabilities (in %) of Arrest for Auto Theft (Males in NLSY97)
Panel weights used in calculating all statistics.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering across 
years for each individual, are in parentheses.Variable    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
county arrest rate for motor vehicle theft 0.130 0.076 0.034 0.054
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.049)
age         -0.602 -0.634 -0.293
(0.338) (0.337) (0.566)
black                 -11.671 -11.625 -7.821
(1.200) (1.200) (1.829)
hispanic -9.600 -9.100 -8.713
(1.239) (1.250) (1.799)
living in MSA                          -4.699 -3.635
(1.266) (1.625)
family income less than $10,000                    2.430
(2.267)
living with both natural parents in1997 0.278
(1.373)
PIAT score (percentile)   0.120
(0.021)
mother a teenager at birth                                -1.620
(2.137)
R-square 0.002 0.019 0.020 0.030
Number of observations 13,800 13,800 13,800 7,141
Notes:
Table 3: OLS Estimates of Perceived Probability (in %) of Arrest for Auto Theft (Males in NLSY97)
All specifications are weighted by panel weights and include a constant. Specifications (ii)-(iv) also control 
for year dummies. Standard errors, corrected for clustering across years for each individual, are in 
parentheses.Percent black 16.40
Percent hispanic 4.25
Percent who stole something worth < $5 17.70
Avg. number of thefts < $5 2.21
Percent who stole something worth > $50 3.72
Avg. number of thefts > $50 0.23
Percent who broke into a building or vehicle 2.29
Avg. number of breakins 0.12
Percent attacking someone to hurt or kill them 8.88
Avg. number of attacks 0.25
Percent arrested 11.90
Percent arrested for a property or violent offense 1.86
Average number of arrests 0.17
Average number of arrests for property or violent offense 0.02
Notes:
Table 4: Total Self-Reported Crimes and Arrests from 1984-1986 (Males in NYS)
Arrests for property offenses include various forms of theft, evading payment, 
burglary, breaking and entering, and dealing in stolen goods.  Arrests for violent 
offenses include assault, robbery, and harassment.Crime All Blacks Hispanics Whites
(i) Steal something worth $5 or less 33.84 43.55 38.37 31.86
(0.90) (2.54) (4.60) (0.97)
(ii) Steal something worth more than $50 57.81 63.10 58.57 56.78
(0.87) (2.25) (4.49) (0.97)
(iii) Break into a building or vehicle 62.49 67.22 66.33 61.54
(0.88) (2.26) (4.71) (0.98)
(iv) Attack someone to hurt or kill them 72.00 72.12 70.61 72.08
(0.82) (2.18) (5.58) (0.90)
Notes:
Standard errors, corrected for clustering across years for each individual, are in parentheses.
Table 5: Average Perceived Probabilities (in %) of Arrest (Males in NYS, 1983 & 1986)Crime
Did not commit 




Number of Crimes 
Committed
(i) Steal something worth $5 or less 35.64 19.19 20.43
         (standard error) (0.97) (1.72) (4.97)
           [sample size] [1,307] [161] [161]
(ii) Steal something worth more than $50 57.94 53.00 46.55
         (standard error) (0.88) (0.88) (0.88)
           [sample size] [1,428] [40] [40]
(iii) Break into a building or vehicle 62.77 51.67 44.67
         (standard error) (0.89) (6.12) (16.12)
           [sample size] [1,432] [36] [36]
(iv) Attack someone to hurt or kill them 73.43 54.78 52.76
         (standard error) (0.81) (3.34) (4.05)
           [sample size] [1,355] [113] [113]
Notes:
Table 6: Mean Perceived Probabilities (in %) of Arrest (Males in NYS, 1983 & 1986)
Standard errors, corrected for clustering across years for each individual, are in parentheses.  Sample 
sizes in brackets.(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)












Age -0.596 -1.111 -0.430 0.393
(0.343) (0.340) (0.344) (0.350)
Black                 9.866 4.974 4.958 -0.721
(3.559) (3.257) (3.260) (3.189)
Hispanic 5.054 1.344 4.964 -0.042
(5.596) (5.362) (5.267) (5.668)
Rural 4.625 6.866 5.129 3.121
(2.163) (2.083) (2.208) (2.129)
Central city -1.813 -1.108 0.584 0.952
(2.161) (2.108) (2.097) (1.937)
Living with both parents in 1976  -1.545 -0.807 -5.109 -1.053
(2.387) (2.353) (2.333) (2.216)
Family income < $10,000 in1976 2.982 0.383 -1.278 -2.039
   (2.606) (2.490) (2.592) (2.442)
Mother graduate from HS -4.323 -1.189 -2.032 -0.819
(2.354) (2.237) (2.225) (2.057)
Father graduate from HS -1.338 -2.554 -3.822 -0.862
(2.364) (2.258) (2.426) (2.247)
Neighborhood crime a problem -1.477 0.845 0.354 -2.472
(1.867) (1.799) (1.777) (1.745)
Neighborhood disarray a problem 0.453 0.212 -1.737 1.444
(2.223) (2.162) (2.181) (2.107)
R-square 0.039 0.031 0.025 0.006
Notes:
Table 7: OLS Estimates of Perceived Probability (in %) of Arrest Among Males in NYS
All specifications also include an intercept term.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering 
across years for each individual, are in parentheses.  Sample size is 1,272.Dependent Variable: Perceived probability of arrest (in %)
Variable    (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
County arrest rate (in percentage terms) -0.036 -0.034 0.029 0.030 -0.061 -0.063
(0.047) (0.047) (0.040) (0.040) (0.064) (0.064)
Perceived probability of arrest in previous year 0.298 0.299 0.036 0.038
    (in percentage terms) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023)
Stole something worth > $50 -4.060 -8.678 -8.272
    in previous year (2.421) (2.289) (3.609)
Sold drugs in previous year -4.515 -5.853 -6.106
(1.779) (1.756) (3.347)
Arrested for theft in previous year 8.712 9.256 11.507
(4.106) (3.876) (6.520)
Num. times stole something worth > $50 -0.314 -0.361 -0.313
    in previous year (0.130) (0.118) (0.195)
Num. times sold drugs in previous year 0.015 -0.110 0.045
(0.044) (0.043) (0.091)
Num. times arrested for theft in previous year 2.692 3.555 -0.049
(1.629) (1.553) (3.074)
Sibling stole something worth > $50 6.813 2.346 1.038
    in previous year (4.317) (4.214) (3.822)
Sibling sold drugs in previous year -7.957 -10.594 -5.123
(3.087) (3.129) (3.681)
Sibling arrested for theft in previous year -3.828 1.696 -4.750
(7.226) (7.994) (7.863)
Num. times siblings stole something -0.334 -0.281 -0.001
    worth > $50 in previous year (0.214) (0.260) (0.177)
Num. times siblings sold drugs -0.086 -0.174 -0.130
    in previous year (0.071) (0.073) (0.089)
Num. times sibling was arrested for theft -1.105 -0.846 -3.808
    in previous year (2.043) (1.803) (2.269)
Tests (P-value):
    No effect of respondent information 0.003 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.373
    No effect of sibling information 0.051 0.037 0.008 0.028 0.524 0.175
    Equal respondent and sibling information 0.118 0.199 0.125 0.261 0.192 0.314
Notes:
(Quasi-first differences)  (Quasi-first diff. with fixed effects)
First difference specifications regress changes in beliefs on changes in MSA status and the variables shown in the table. OLS quasi-first 
difference specifications regress current beliefs on the variables shown in the table as well as controls for race, age, MSA status, year dummies, 
PIAT percentile, whether the respondent lived with both natural parents at age 14, and whether the respondent's mother was a teenager when 
he was born.  GMM (quasi-first difference with fixed effects) specifications control for age and MSA status in addition to the variables in the 
table.  Tests of no effect of respondent (or sibling) information jointly test whether all coefficients on own (or sibling) crimes and arrests are 
zero.  Test of equal respondent and sibling information tests whether all coefficients on crimes and arrests are equal for siblings and 
respondents.  Tests in panels (A) and (B) are F-tests, while those in panel (C) are Wald tests.   Standard errors for coefficient estimates are in 
parentheses.
(First differences)
Table 8: Belief Updating Among Males in the NLSY97
(C) GMM (A) OLS (B) OLSDependent Variable: Perceived Probability of Arrest (in %) in 1986
Variable    (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Perceived probability of arrest in 1983 0.318 0.319 0.329 0.325 0.371 0.370 0.249 0.268
    (in percentage terms) (0.037) (0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Committed respective crime since 1984 -12.387 -8.669 -25.639 -19.164
(3.283) (5.678) (7.024) (3.591)
Number of times committed respective crime -0.318 -0.870 -4.283 -4.642
    since 1984 (0.139) (0.392) (1.708) (0.863)
Arrested for violent or property crime 6.568 7.103 18.097 12.012
    since 1984 (8.167) (8.136) (7.980) (7.672)
Number of times arrested for violent 4.300 10.008 15.297 9.349
    or property crime since 1984 (6.415) (6.729) (6.681) (6.245)
Central city status 1.528 -1.772 0.946 0.751 2.740 2.522 1.094 1.196
(2.536) (3.074) (2.450) (2.452) (2.439) (2.449) (2.404) (2.405)
Rural status 0.945 0.192 3.480 3.173 3.446 3.488 -0.150 -0.059
(3.056) (4.031) (2.944) (2.946) (2.931) (2.943) (2.903) (2.904)
Neighborhood crime a problem -1.085 -0.650 1.647 0.915 2.789 1.720 -1.977 -2.475
(2.431) (3.004) (2.360) (2.353) (2.347) (2.349) (2.324) (2.317)
Neighborhood disarray a problem 1.345 6.053 -1.647 -1.111 -2.793 -2.297 -0.734 0.195
(2.777) (3.543) (2.691) (2.702) (2.676) (2.701) (2.642) (2.647)
Victim of a crime since 1984 1.878 -4.332 3.698 3.605 2.618 2.761 1.788 1.589
(2.322) (2.855) (2.249) (2.243) (2.228) (2.240) (2.205) (2.208)
Tests (P-value):
    No effect of respondent information 0.001 0.068 0.288 0.066 0.001 0.014 <.0001 <.0001
    No effect of neighborhood crime or disarray 0.852 0.217 0.725 0.889 0.396 0.628 0.573 0.536
Notes:
Break in
worth < $5 worth > $50
All specifications also control for age, race/ethnicity (black and hispanic), whether the individual's parents earned less than $10,000 in 1976, and 
whether the individual lived with both natural parents in 1976. Test for no effect of respondent information is an F-test whether the coefficients on 
arrests and crimes committed since 1984 are both zero.  Test for no effect of neighborhood crime or disarray is an F-test whether the coefficients on 
changes in neighborhood crime and disarray indicators are both zero.
Table 9: Belief Updating Among Males in the NYS
Attack Someone Steal something Steal something